SECRET (Unclassified upon removal of enclosures)

From: Commanding Officer, Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-05A5G)

Subj: OPNAV Report 5750-1 (Command History); submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12

Encl: (1) Command History 1 OCT through 31 DEC 66
(2) Command History 1 JAN through 30 SEP 66
(3) Command History (TACAMO Component) 1 JAN 64 through 31 DEC 66

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are submitted.

F. H. ROTIh
Acting

Copy to:
CNO (Op-0389)
CINCPACFLT
COMFAIRWESTPAC
HISTORY OF AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON ONE (VW-1)
1 October 1966 through 31 December 1966

A. CHRONOLOGY

I. October,
   a. 1 October - Crew 8 was formed.
   b. 21 October - The squadron was awarded a COMNAVAIRPAC
      Quarterly Aviation Safety Award - Second Quarter.
   c. 31 October - The squadron was awarded a CINCPACFLT
      Meritorious Service Citation for 1965.

II. November,
   a. 1 November - Crew NINE was formed.
   b. 13 November - Crew NINE flew its first operational Mission.
   c. 16-23 Nov - A Search and Rescue mission was flown for
      VAP-61 personnel and aircraft. The squadron acted as on-scene commander.

B. BASIC NARRATIVE

I. Command Organization and Relations
   a. Commander John D. GIBBS, USN, took command of VW-1 on
      15 JUL 1966. On 19 NOV 1966, Commander GIBBS assumed the duties of
      CTG 70.3 and Commander Fleet Air Detachment Guam.
   b. The squadron homeported at NAS Agana, Guam, Marianas
      Islands with a detachment of one officer and approximately fifteen
      enlisted men at NAVSTA Sangley Point, Philippine Islands. The squadron,
      which is also designated TU 70.3,4, is under the Operational Control
      of Commander SEVENTH Fleet and the Administrative Control of Commander
      Fleet Air, Western Pacific.
c. Squadron Missions.

1. Primary mission is Weather Reconnaissance, covering an area bounded by the International Dateline west of the Malay Peninsula, and from the Equator to the North Pole. In this role, the squadron works in conjunction with the Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam. Weather reconnaissance commitments are levied upon the squadron by the Tropical Cyclone Reconnaissance Center (TCRC).

2. Secondary mission is providing Airborne Early Warning radar coverage to units of the SEVENTH Fleet operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. In addition of providing low boogy detection, squadron aircraft provide "MIDDLE-MAN" (automatic UHF relay), "BELL HOP" (radar relay), airborne intercept control, search and rescue coordination, and weather observations for the SEVENTH Fleet units.

3. Tertiary mission of the squadron is providing pilot/crew training for C-121 aircraft users in the Pacific. (Besides VV-1) This is primarily for VQ-1, stationed at NAS Atsugi, Japan.

4. The squadron had weather reconnaissance and communication liaison commitments in support of the Gemini and Apollo programs in the Western Pacific.

d. Command Composition.

1. Seven WC-121N, two EC-121K, and one C-121 type aircraft have been assigned to VV-1. One of these aircraft is normally in a pool status at Lockheed Air Service, Kennedy International Airport, New York, for progressive maintenance. Because of this pool aircraft, the squadron has essentially operated NINE aircraft during 1966.
2. In addition to the Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and the TACAMO Component, the squadron has a very extensive Training Department to meet the requirements of its training mission.

3. As of 31 December 1966, the squadron had 92 officers and 431 enlisted men onboard. Of these, there were 209 enlisted crew members, 16 enlisted non-crew members and 88 officer crew members.

e. There were no activations, deactivations or redesignations of units within the organization during the period covered by this report.

II. Operations or Activities.

a. Airborne Early Warning.

1. During the last quarter of 1966, the squadron continued to maintain a detachment at the Naval Station Sangley Point, Philippine Islands. TWO crews operated from this base providing combat support radar coverage for the SEVENTH Fleet. This coverage was provided nightly throughout the year. The coverage consisted of Airborne Early Warning between the hours of 2300H and 0600H. The crews were rotated back to Guam approximately every fourteen days. While at Sangley Point, a crew flew every other night. Departure time was 1830H with arrival on station at 2300H. An East-West barrier was established at approximately 20 degrees North Latitude between the coast of Vietnam and Hainan Island. From this position, the squadron aircraft were able to provide radar surveillance for the SEVENTH Fleet. At 0600H, the aircraft departed station, arriving at Sangley Pt. at 1030H.
b. Weather Reconnaissance.

1. Aerial weather reconnaissance is defined as the collection of meteorological data by airborne personnel and equipment. The type and content of data obtained is simply an extension of the regular surface weather observation network. Major differences are: (1) reconnaissance missions are usually flown in extremely remote areas, (2) the specialized aircraft used, and (3) a moving instrument platform (aircraft) employed. The reconnaissance aircraft becomes a flying weather office capable of obtaining meteorological data over a wide geographic area, analyzing all such data, precisely locating or predicting the location of any weather phenomena and pressure systems, and transmitting both routine and emergency type weather communications.

The squadron's weather flights usually last 12-16 hours during which the aircraft obtains two fixes, 0900Z and 1500Z. The first fix is normally made during a low level penetration at an altitude of 1500 feet or below. After the fix, the aircraft climbs in the eye of the storm to the SEVEN HUNDRED millibar level making an ascent sounding during the climb. For the next six hours the aircraft circumnavigates the storm, in a box or triangular pattern, determining wind velocity and direction and making dropsonde observations thereby attaining valuable data concerning the storms intensity and potential growth. The second fix is usually made at the SEVEN HUNDRED millibar level with the use of radar.

A great deal of cooperation is necessary between the meteorologist, CIC operators, navigators, and pilot in order to make accurate fixes and obtain all the data necessary for good reconnaissance.
III. Special Topics.

A. Operational Statistics.

1. Airborne Early Warning. In 1966, VW-1 flew 12,961.3 hours of which 3,394.3 hours were in the last quarter.

   a. Special operations in the Gulf of Tonkin accounted for 5,226.2 hours of the yearly total. These hours were accumulated on 359 separate flights. The squadron made 98.4% of its commitments, missing only 16 flights. Most of the "busts" were caused by the aircraft being called off station by the SEVENTH Fleet in order to fly weather reconnaissance, the squadron's primary mission.

   b. In the last quarter, 1315.6 AEW hours were flown. These hours represent 90 missions during which only two "busts" occurred, giving the squadron a 97.8% record.

2. Weather Reconnaissance.

   a. Providing weather information to Fleet Weather Central accounted for 2,504.1 squadron flight hours during the year. Squadron aircraft flew reconnaissance on 28 named storms and made 275 fixes. During the year, seven fix requirements were missed, due to mechanical failure, producing a record of 94.5%. Along with the storm requirements, the squadron flew 159 synoptic tracks (meteorological data gathering flights).

   b. The last quarter of 1966 accounted for 632.7 of the yearly weather reconnaissance hours. These hours were accumulated while flying requirements on six named storms, making 62 fixes. During this time, the squadron flew 35 synoptic flights.
3. **Training.**

   a. In 1966, pilot training accounted for 1190.4 hours. Nineteen pilots were upgraded to Aircraft Commander, 18 made Second Pilot, and 17 qualified as Third Pilot. Also, 40 CIC officers were upgraded, and 24 navigators received new designations. At the same time, 25 weathermen were upgraded; 9 flight meteorologists were designated, 4 first aerographers and 12 second aerographers received new designations.

   b. During the last quarter, five aircraft commanders were upgraded, while 6 second-pilots were designated and 6 third-pilots qualified. Twenty-two CIC officers were upgraded and 13 navigators were designated. At the same time, 9 weathermen received new designations: 2 flight meteorologists, 2 first aerographers and 5 second aerographers.

4. **TACAMO.** TACAMO's flight hours are included in the total squadron hours.

5. **Miscellaneous.**

   During the year, 206.8 hours were flown on test flights, and 121.6 hours were accumulated during transport flights with 292.5 hours being accounted for during transpac flights (primarily between Guam and the Philippines). Ferry flights to New York for overhaul contributed 704.2 hours; search and rescue missions amounted to 197.1 hours.

**B. Material**

   1. During the last quarter, the squadron experienced no major maintenance problems.
2. The squadron has been allotted the APN-159, radar altimeter, APN-153, and the ASN-41, Doppler navigation gear. None of these systems have proven operational, because, although the squadron had most of the components, it lacked the test benches. The situation should improve as the APN-159 and APN-153 test benches have arrived recently.

3. The engineering performance has been entirely satisfactory during this period.

C. Major Conversions and Modifications. There have been no major conversions or modifications during the reporting period.

D. Port and Base Developments. No major port or base developments have occurred during the last quarter.

E. Development in Command and Control Systems. No development of command and control systems has occurred during the last quarter.

F. Developments in Tactics or Doctrine. During the last quarter, the squadron has developed no tactics or doctrine.

G. A Summary of Major Intelligence Collected. No major intelligence was collected by the squadron.

H. Communications.

1. The volume of message traffic in the squadron in the last quarter represents a total of 4,564 transmissions. Of these, 3,963 were incoming messages and 561 were outgoing. This represents an average 48 per day, 42 incoming and 6 outgoing.

2. In the communication area, the squadron has experienced no major difficulties.
I. (U) Supply and Logistics. The primary supply difficulties are those normally experienced by overseas activities.

J. Major Policy and Planning Developments.

1. In early October 1966, the Commanding Officer made the determination that the squadron was capable of doubling the AEW coverage to the SEVENTH Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. This would commence 1 JAN 1967 and continue at least until the 1967 typhoon season started, about 1 JUN. It was felt that this could be accomplished with the present squadron resources in aircraft and men, even though the squadron was still manned for only six C-121 type aircraft.

While it was hoped that the squadron could stage from Danang, thereby decreasing the Sangley Pt. - Gulf of Tonkin transit time from 4½ hours to 1 hour, the double coverage could be provided by maintaining four aircraft at Sangley Point. The Commander SEVENTH Fleet was very receptive to the idea of increased coverage and on 3 October requested the coverage as soon as possible.

By mid-November, it became apparent that base loading problems would prevent the squadron from utilizing Danang. About this same time, the 10,000 ft. concrete runway at Chu Lai, 60 miles south of Danang, was completed. On 1 December, the Commanding Officer sent an aircraft to Chu Lai to explore the possibilities of staging from there. Reports brought back indicated that from an operational standpoint, this would be an excellent base for the following reasons:

a. The 10,000 ft. runway, with clear approaches and 1,000 ft. overruns at each end, would allow much safer operations than the 8,000 ft. runway at Sangley which had no overruns and a sea wall at both ends of the runway.
b. Chu Lai was only 1½ hours from our on-station position in the Gulf of Tonkin compared to 4½ hours from Sangley Pt. One aircraft could provide 12 hours coverage each night with only 2½ hours transit time involved in contrast to two aircraft and 18 hours transit time necessary when operating from Sangley Point. It would require 14½ flight hours from Chu Lai compared to 36 flight hours from Sangley to provide the same 12 hour on-station coverage.

Aircraft parts and berthing space for personnel were considered the two biggest problems but neither were insurmountable. Therefore, on 6 December the Commanding Officer requested permission to commence operations from Chu Lai as soon as possible. On 27 December, CINCPAC authorized operations from Chu Lai. These operations commenced on 18 January 1967 and will be covered in subsequent reports.

2. Early in 1966, tests were begun on a Pacific Typhoon Reconnaissance Network, utilizing four frequencies in the low frequency range. Five sets of tests were conducted throughout the year. This network provides for direct communications between weather reconnaissance aircraft in the Western Pacific and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam, thus bypassing the intermediate communication stations, such as Clark and Andersen Airways.

The results of these tests have been compiled. A recommendation that this network be activated was presented to the Pacific Typhoon Conference in JAN 1967.

K. Casualties. There were no casualties to men or equipment during the period covered by this report.

Enclosure (1)
L. Personnel.

1. The squadron went through a great change in its personnel structure in 1966. The BUPERS allowance for enlisted personnel was 594 as of 31 December 1966. With only 431 men onboard, it is obvious that the squadron is undermanned. It must be noted that this allowance includes a 210 man Southeast Asia augmentation force. On the other hand the BUPERS allowance for officers was 75 with 92 onboard. In this case, the squadron received the SEA officers augmentation before the allowance was established by BUPERS.

2. Squadron morale was high as evidenced by the re-enlistment rates for the year. Even though the workload was very heavy, due to the increased commitments and lack of adequate flight and ground personnel, 67% of the men up for their first reenlistment shipped over and 96% of career type personnel shipped over. This compares to 14% and 80% for AIRPAC.

M. Medical and Dental Activities.

1. The squadron flight surgeon deployed periodically to Sangley Point in addition to his regular duties on Guam. He conducted lectures regularly for all personnel on topics ranging from first aid in the aircraft to health problems in forward areas.

2. The squadron's dental problems are handled by the NAS Agana Dental staff. There were no significant activities pertaining to the squadron.

N. Activities of the Chaplain. No Chaplain is assigned to the squadron. The NAS Chaplains conduct moral guidance lectures regularly and have been helpful by informing personnel of family deaths, sickness, etc.
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O. Community Relations and Civic Action.

1. In conjunction with the Catholic Chaplain, the Enlisted Recreation Council distributed Christmas presents to underprivileged children on the island.

2. The squadron has adopted a foster child, Lee Soon Bum of Korea, and contributes at least $15.00 a month for his support through the "Foster Parents Plan".

P. Agreements. There have been no agreements reached with other agencies or foreign representatives, although negotiations were completed for a new deployment base at Chu Lai, Vietnam.

Q. Special Training. There was no special training as outlined in reference (a).

R. Research and Development Projects. There were no research development projects other than those discussed under major policy and planning developments.

S. Disaster Relief, Rescue and Humanitarian Activities.

1. During the period, 16 NOV - 23 NOV, the squadron flew around the clock and acted as the "On Scene Commander" for a search and rescue operation for VAP-61 personnel lost in an A3B flight from Cubi Point, Philippine Islands, to Agana, Guam. The aircraft went down approximately 60 miles west of Guam about 2136 on 15 NOV 66. It was at this position that the navigator, LTJG R. SLOWACEK, was rescued by the NAS helicopter. The pilot, CDR W. GRADY and the civilian technical representative aboard, Mr P. KLEIN, were lost. The search area was extended westward approximately 200 miles from the last report position of the aircraft and 100 miles to the south.

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Enclosure (1)
T. *Awards.*

1. The COMNAVAIRPAC Quarterly Aviation Safety Award for the first and second quarters of 1966 were received on 17 JUN and 21 OCT 1966 respectively.

2. Thirty nine officers and men received Air Medals. An additional forty-eight squadron personnel became eligible as of 31 DEC. Because of the squadron's continued commitments with the SEVENTH Fleet, many more men will become eligible for Air Medals in the near future. All squadron personnel have been authorized the National Defense Medal and all qualified flight crew members the Vietnam Service Medal and Vietnam Campaign Medal.

3. On 31 OCT, the squadron received a citation from CINCPOCFLT, for "meritorious service in support of operations in Vietnam" and the Pacific Command Typhoon Warning Service Award during the period 1 JAN 65 to 31 DEC 65."

U. *Oceanographic or Port Surveys.* During this reporting period, there have been no oceanographic or port surveys conducted by the squadron.

V. *Notable Records or Firsts.*

1. During the month of NOV, the squadron flew a total of 1293.9 hours surpassing the previous monthly record of 1,053 hours set in April, 1965.

2. As of 31 DEC, the squadron had flown 108,068.3 accident free hours since commissioning in 1952. Although no records are kept by the Naval Aviation Safety Center in Norfolk, Virginia, it is believed that this is a record for operational squadrons in the Pacific Fleet.
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FOOTNOTES:

1 See appendices I-A and XII-A
2 See appendices II-B
3 See appendices VIII, A, 1 and VIII, A, 2
4 See appendix VIII, B, 1
5 See appendices VII, A-F
E. Index to Appendices.

I. Photographs.
   A. Training Photograph
   B. VW-1 Aircraft
   C. 100,000 Accident Free Hour Ceremony

II. Operational Report.
   A. Aircraft Commander Report (Sample)
   B. Aircraft Assigned

III. Cruise Book. This command did not publish a cruise book in 1966

IV. Major Operations Orders. There were no major operations orders, plans or staff studies printed by the squadron during the reporting period.

V. Technical Reports.
   A. Pacific Typhoon Warning Net

VI. Muster Roll and Officer Roster.
   A. Muster Roll
   B. Officer Roster

VII. Award Citations and Congratulatory messages.
   A. Naval Weather Service Award for 1965
   B. CTF 77 Commendation Message
   C. COMNAVAIRPAC Quarterly Aviation Safety Award - FIRST Quarter
   D. COMNAVAIRPAC Quarterly Aviation Safety Award - SECOND Quarter
   E. CINCPACFLT Citation for Meritorious Service
   F. Air Medal Citation, temporary - (sample)
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VIII. Summaries and Reports.

A. Operations.
   1. Operations Summary - 1966
   2. Flights and Flight Hours

B. Weather Reconnaissance.
   1. Weather Reconnaissance Summary - 1966

IX. Public Orientation Booklet.

X. Squadron Newspaper - DEC 1966

XI. Background Data.

XII. Newspaper Articles.

A. Training

B. Watchdogs of WESTPAC
COMMAND HISTORY

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON ONE

1967
From: Commanding Officer, Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE  
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05A36)  
Subj: OPMNAV Report 5750-1 (Command History); submission of  
Ref: (a) OPMNAVINST 5750.12 (Series)  
Encl:  
(1) Command History 1 JAN through 31 DEC 67  
(2) Command History (TACANO Component) 1 JAN through 31 DEC 67  

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are hereby submitted.  

2. Annex C of enclosure (1) will be submitted separately at a later date.

[Signature]

Copy to:  
CNO (OP-0989)  
CINC PACFLT

[Signature]
January

1. On-station time for aircraft operating with the SEVENTH Fleet increased from six to twelve hours (1800H to 0600H).

2. TE-1 inducted at LAG, NY for PAR.

9. TE-7 accepted from VAF-32 ferry crew on Guam after PAR.

20. CORNAVATPAC requests NAVAIRSVCNAO to supply necessary parts for BIG LOOK Modification to KC-130 aircraft.

February

7. ANECON ONE DET SANGLEY deactivated.

7. On-station time for aircraft operating with the SEVENTH Fleet changed from 1800H - 0600H to 1800H - 0700H.

8. TE-2 inducted at LAG, NY for PAR.

10. "MS-111 HUH Coastal Surveillance" (C) operation ends mission to VV-1 operations in the Gulf.


15. ANECON ONE states that support will be available to NCAR for the Line Islands Experiment. First aircraft arriving 22 February at Bikini AFS.

March

5. TE-1 accepted from VAF-32 ferry crew on Guam after PAR.

14. After requests from COMFAIRWEASTPAC, ANECON ONE states that status of BIG LOOK Modification program somewhat static, and requests assistance from COMFAIRWEASTPAC.

18. "Night Anti-PT Boat Plan" (C) promulgated by CTF 77. ANECON ONE is primary search and controlling agency. This is an expansion of "HUH Coastal Surveillance".

29. TE-2 inducted at LAG, NY for PAR.

April

13. ANECON ONE Detachment Charlie personnel notified that they will be moving from Marine Task Force N-guy on 14 April.

15. ANECON ONE requests housing in MAC-13 area when funds available.

May

6. TE-3 accepted from VAF-32 ferry crew on Guam after PAR.
May

19 AEWRON ONE receives order to be converted to VAP-12 area.

17 COMMANDER PACIFIC reports status of BIG LOOK Modification to VAP-12 to NAVWEPSHQ.

16 Squadron moves from repair berth to Hangar 17-170.

June

1 TE-4 inducted at LAI, NY for PAR.

1 TE-1 accepted from VAP-37 ferry crew on Guam after PAR.


20 CTF 77 congratulates crew of Rainproof Two for rescue of crew of Sunfighter 07.

July

2 Detachment Charlie informs AEWRON ONE that all officers will move to Naval Supply Activity, Chu Lai Detachment quarters on 4 July.

21 TE-4 Accepted from VAP-37 ferry crew on Guam after PAR.

24 TE-90 inducted at LAI, NY for PAR.

August

9 "IR/RAE Operating Procedures" (U) promulgated by CTF 77. AEWRON ONE to provide radar surveillance/flight following for VAP-61 while on their flights.

12 AEWRON ONE proposes to COMFAIRWESTPAC that COMWEVENTFLT messages of December 1966 constitutes sufficient authority to install BIG LOOK equipment.

20 Proposed target date for Chu Lai runway closure.

25 COMFAIRWESTPAC gives go-ahead on BIG LOOK Modification.

26 Quiz Show 69 disappears from radar scope of Rainproof 02.

September

8 AEWRON ONE states to Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VC-1) that TE-8 will be available in Atsugi, Japan for BIG LOOK Modification of September 9.

9-14 BIG LOOK Modification made to TE-9.

23 Flight Operations resume at Detachment Charlie.
November 22  CE-20 accepted from VW-12 forty years on 30mm after TAV.
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A. MISSIONS

Commander Franklin H. Rock relieved Commander John D. Gibbs at 1200z on 6 July 1957 as Commanding Officer, Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE. AEWRON ONE is based ashore at the Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam.

AEWRON ONE has been assigned three missions: (1) typhoon and tropical cyclone reconnaissance in the Western Pacific from the International Date Line west to the Malay Peninsula and from the equator northward; (2) airborne early warning for the SEVENTH Fleet, nightly, in the Gulf of Tonkin; and (3) training of pilots and aircrews for Pacific users of the C-121 aircraft.

B. WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE

AEWRON ONE operates from air stations and air bases in the Western Pacific to accomplish its primary mission of weather reconnaissance. In this mission, the squadron works in conjunction with the Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam. Weather reconnaissance requirements are levied by the Tropical Cyclone Reconnaissance Center (TCRC).

The squadron's weather flights usually last 12-15 hours during which time the aircraft obtains two "fixes", 1000z and 1600z. The first fix is normally the end product of a low level penetration of the eye of the storm; low level being defined as 1500 feet or below. After the fix, the aircraft exits the storm and flies to specified positions in the northern half of the storm at a distance of between 200 and 200 nautical miles. Then the aircraft is light enough to climb, it ascends to the SEVEN HUNDRED millibar level making an ascent spanning the cloud. During the six hour period between fixes the aircraft is determining wind velocity and direction and at high altitude is making dropsonde
observations thereby collecting valuable data concerning the area's
intensity and potential for growth. The second fire is usually made at
the SEVEN HUNDRED millimeter level with the use of radar.

C. AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING

Prior to January 15, 1967, the squadron maintained a detachment at
Naval Station, Sangley Point, Republic of the Philippines, to provide
six hours on-station ASW coverage in the Tonkin Gulf. On January 1,
1967, the amount of on-station time was increased to twelve hours.\(^1\) The
increased time required four aircraft at the detachment. In February
the on-station times were changed to 1000H to 1700H from the previous
1400H to 0700H to provide more coverage during the hours of darkness
and in the early morning.\(^2\)

In addition to the established mission profiles for the EC-121
aircraft when it flies airborne early warning missions, VJ-1 was addi-
tionally tasked with two new secondary, but no less important, missions
in 1967. The first of these was titled: "North Vietnamese Coastal
Surveillance."\(^3\) Commander Task Force Seven Seven, in this February
message, requested VJ-1 "to provide surveillance from 16\(^\circ\)N to 26\(^\circ\)-40\(^\circ\)N
giving particular attention to areas where contacts enter near or into...
On-station aircraft were further directed to make all visualized reports
to "Perfume" (Yankee Team Commander) on CDR FNK (HMS Enterprise) strike
frequency. This requirement was for a one day period.\(^4\)

\(^1\) ACTION ONE 200921Z FEB 67

\(^2\) ACTION ONE 060253Z FEB 67

\(^3\) CTF 77 121543Z FEB 67, "NORTH COASTAL SURVEILLANCE" (J)

\(^4\) Ibid., para. 3
On February 12, Commander Task Group (CTG) 77.0 requested that VN-1 continue reporting waterborne logistics craft (WBLC) on CLAMOR strike frequency until further notice. This prompted a re-evaluation by the squadron of its position in the Gulf, our operating altitudes and our operator techniques.

In March the "NVM COASTAL SURVEILLANCE" was formally promulgated by message as "NIGHT ANTI-PT BOAT PLAN." According to this plan, VN-1 was to "provide surveillance and detection of PT boats in the Cape Ba and Grand Horan Island Chain." Large deck OWA condition aircraft would be launched as directed by CTG 77.0 and would be controlled by a NC-121 with the North SAR, PIRAZ and CTG 77.0 monitoring and tracking. The procedures for the NC-121 were spelled out very clearly: "NC-121 adjusts when dir by CTG 77.0 ex seq to provide adequate coverage, bellhop and comm ... track and rpt surf contacts ... providing CUS/SP on contacts moving away from islands on NVN coast in generally southerly direction ... control aircraft launched for invas/attack of surfcraft vectoring aircraft to contacts."

Prior to this explicit directive, on-station aircraft had been gradually moving farther and farther north in the Gulf. This was of course, due to the northward movement of the Yankee Station carriers. Our limit had been 18-30N, the "Golden Gate", but now our barrier was

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5 CTG 77.0 120515Z FEB 67
6 CTG 77 130832Z MAR 67, "NIGHT ANTI-PT BOAT PLAN" (2)
7 Ibid., para. 2a.
8 Ibid., para. 2c.
planned for between coordinates 19°23'N, 106°22'W and 20°34'N, 107°22'W. Our altitude was raised from 3500 feet to 4500 feet to extend the range of the APG-29.

Since this time, on-station aircraft have figured in a number of investigations of high-speed contacts.

The second task given to VN-1 was promulgated by message in August. CTF 77 was concerned over the time during which no communications were available with the RA38 infra-red aircraft attached to Heavy Photographic Squadron SIXTY-ONE (VAP-61). Mission duration for the RA38 normally is not in excess of one-half hour, however its extremely low altitude makes communication with VT carriers impossible. Radar contact is also lost when the RA38 goes "feet dry".

To ensure constant radar contact and communications, VN-1 was requested "to shift station and altitude as necessary in order to provide RA38 flight following over the proposed track at the proposed TOT." ¹⁰

The RA38's normal track is much further south than our barrier which was promulgated in March. The squadron determined that on-station aircraft would come south to a latitude around 19°20'N in order to track and maintain communications with the RA38. Procedures for the WC-121 were established and it was understood that no communications would be received from the RA38 during the period it was over land. Notification of proposed track and TOT would be received by message (DPRP-1) from VAP-61 Detachment Cubi.¹¹

Although procedures are working smoothly even all units are aware

⁹ AMERICAN ONE 200724Z MAR 67, para. 1h.
¹⁰ CTF 77 091620Z AUG 67, "ER/RA38 Operating Procedures", para. 2h.
¹¹ Ibid., para. 3.
that an RA3B flight will be in the area, the primary cause for concern is non-receipt of the OERP-1 by the VC-1 detachment. Communications at Detachment Charlie are tenuous at best, and non-receipt means that information on RA3B flights must be passed by the QAC-122 method from the TT CDR to the incoming VC-121 each night. Attempts are now underway to determine the reason for non-delivery or excessive delay of these messages.

Since this flight following mission has been assigned there has been one instance where loss of the RA3B occurred while the VC-121 crew was tracking it.

This occurred on August 25, 1967, when Quiz Show 09 (RA3B) disappeared from the radar of Rainproof 02 (VC-121). Aircraft Commander on Rainproof 02 was LCDR Fred (n) Heidenauer and his OIC was LTJG Stanley M. Trollope. LTJG Trollope lost contact and communications at 19°-20'N, 105°-52'E, at 1350Z (2100H). Repeated efforts were made to contact 09 after LTJG Trollope notified FRAZ and TC CDR. 02 diverted to Chu Lai at 1530Z (2330H) due to failure of #2 engine.12

D. TRAINING

AIRRON ONE is responsible for training pilots and aircrewsman for Pacific users of the S-3A aircraft. The squadron's training department conducts ground schools and systems schools for other commands (usually Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VC-11) or Pacific Missile Range (PMR) as requirements are needed. AIRRON ONE pilots are trained on a continuing basis.

In 1967, AIRRON ONE trained 15 pilots in the aircraft commander syllabus, of which 5 went to VC-1. 12 pilots were trained in the Second

12 See Annex B, Enclosure 2

PAGE 9 OF 26
Pilots syllabus, 1 of which went to UQ. 30 syllabus went through.
the third pilot syllabus, 2 of those going to UQ-1.
Aircraft assigned to Airborne Early Warning Squadron CWF and the JACARO.

Component thereof are listed below:

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<tr>
<th>SC121K</th>
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<tr>
<td>BC120G-JACARO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A. 1967 Weather Reconnaissance

"During the calendar year 1967, a total of 23 typhoons, 13 tropical storms and 6 tropical depressions were detected in the Western North Pacific area between 150 degrees longitude and the Malay Peninsula, north of the equator ..."13

The squadron is normally assigned two flights, at 1000Z and 1900Z, if possible. Penetration into the eye of the tropical storm or typhoon is most desirable. Low level (1990 feet or below) penetration is more desirable than intermediate level (7000m usually corresponding to 10,000 feet) because of the data gathered. Low level penetration allows the meteorologist to observe surface wind with the leading moisture.

In 1967, VS-1 flew a total of 4682.4 weather hours.14 This figure includes flights on typhoons, named tropical storms, tropical depressions, daily investigations, synoptic tracks and special weather. In September, the record month for flight hours accumulated, VS-1 flew 779.6 weather hours. On October 17, 1967, the squadron had five aircraft airborne simultaneously flying weather missions.

The squadron's efforts during Typhoons Silda and Harriet received special praise. VS-1 provided advance warning and accurate track of both storms to Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam, thus giving other islands in the Marianas chain ample time to prepare for their passage.

The squadron also participated in the Line Islands Experiment in February and March, 1967, until operational commitments prohibited further participation.

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13 Commanding Officer, U.S. Fleet Weather Central/Joint Typhoon Warning Center, Guam, Annual Typhoon Report, 1967, cover letter, Ser 05 of 3 JAN 68
14 See Annex E., Enclosure (1) for breakdown of total weather flight hours.
1. **Line Island Experiment.**

The Line Island Experiment, supported by the National Science Foundation and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), was initiated to determine the validity and usefulness of the Applications Technology Satellite ONE (ATS-1). The ATS-1 was sent aloft to photograph the visible surface of the earth at 20 minute intervals during daylight hours. Series of pictures from this satellite, it was hoped, would give a broad view of "daytime diurnal and semi-diurnal cloud cycles over the sea."15 "Only by interpreting information from ATS-1 in the light of direct measurements within the troposphere can we hope to establish parameters."16

AVONON ONE was invited to participate in this research by providing an aircraft to take the actual data in the photographed area during the period from February 15 to March 15. The aircraft itself would be required to fly to specified positions and make drop sondes, visual and instrumental observations every fifteen minutes. NCAR would supply cameras, and radar photographs would be made at the same time.17

W-1 agreed and stated that the required support would be available for the period from 25 February to March 25. Our aircraft would be based at Hickam Air Force Base on February 22. In this correspondence we requested authorization from NCAR/AFD to carry certain civilian observers on these flights.

Due to operational difficulties and aircraft availability in early March, the experiment's participation had to be cancelled.18 On March 6,
a message was sent to Hickam AFB ordering the aircraft there to return to Guam. Our involvement with NCIA and the LIE was terminated on March 7, 1957.

2. Moving the Squadron.

Following nearly three years of negotiations, delays, and setbacks, AERONCONE finally moved to the eastern side of NAS Alcon. In order to affect this move it had been necessary for Heavy Photographic Squadron SIXE-ONE (HAP-61) to relocate from their old quarters in building 17-400, the northern hangar at NAS, to one approximately 150 yards to the south. Building 17-400 would then become USN's new working spaces. The hangar would be shared with AERONCONE WP-502 Yocomonis and the Naval Air Station H.P. However, HAP-61 was able to obtain all of the spaces on the south side of the hangar.

On Saturday, May 25, the move was available and the move progressed. By Sunday 11 o'clock, all departments had been moved and "business as usual" could resume on Monday morning. Two weeks were spent cleaning and painting spaces for Rear Admiral Marshall W. White, Commander Fleet Air, Central Pacific, who was to make an informal inspection on June 18.

3. Airborne Early Warning

1. Moving the Detachment.

In December 1956, authority was granted to the Commander SEVENTH Fleet (CONEVENTHFLF) by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLP) for Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE (AERONCONE) to relocate their..."
Detachment from the Naval Station, Sangley Point, Republic of the Philippines, to the Marine Corps Air Station, Chu Lai, Republic of Vietnam. 22

The Commander SEVENTH Fleet in turn directed AEWRON ONE to move two aircraft to Chu Lai by the 15th of January and to provide an advance cadre of two to four persons to be in Chu Lai by the 7th of January. 23 This advance cadre was ordered to be available to receive and maintain custody of material consigned in an airlift proposed earlier by Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific. Personnel chosen for this task were Commander Robert W. Lancaster, HO-1 William H. Mueller, ADR2 George R. Russell and AN Robert Spence.

AEWRON ONE planned to have the first aircraft take off from Chu Lai on the 13th at 1800H and fly the first AEW mission for the SEVENTH Fleet. The aircraft was to be on station at 1800H. 24

On the 7th of January the advance cadre arrived and began preparations to accommodate the first crew from Sangley Point. Housing and messing facilities had been arranged and a "Butler hut" at the northern end of the runway was made ready.

On the 16th of January at 1416H, YE-8 (Call Sign - Rainproof Eight) left Sangley Point to fly the first six hours of a twelve hour AEW barrier. It landed at Chu Lai at 0126H on the 17th. Lieutenant Commander Ralph L. Cherson was the Aircraft Commander. Rainproof 8 was followed by Rainproof 4 which took off at 1900H. Rainproof 4 was on station at 2400H and then landed at Sangley Point at 1215H on the 17th after leaving station at 0300H.

22 CINCPACFLT 3001142 DEC 66
23 CONSEVENTHFLT 0347222 JAN 67
24 AEWRON ONE 0402202 JAN 67
Lieutenant Commander Robert H. Bates was the Aircraft Commander. 25

On the 17th of January, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth C. Crow took TE-5, Rainproof 5, on the first half of this day's barrier, taking off at 1330H and landing back at Sangley Point at 0018H on the 18th. Following Rainproof 5 for the second half of the 17th's barrier was Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Curtis Thurman in Rainproof 1. Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Thurman took off from Sangley Point at 1430H and landed at Chu Lai at 0700H on the 18th. Thus, on the 18th, TE-8 and TE-1 had been repositioned at Chu Lai. 26 These crews then flew every other night on flights totaling about 15 hours. They remained in-country for two weeks.

The airplanes at Sangley Point remained for a short time as back-ups for the new detachment. On February 11th at 1330H, ACTION ONE Detachment Sangley Point was formally disbanded and all "Temporary duty personnel were terminated with the exception of those at ZUA." 27 Relocating the detachment thus obviated the need for the four aircraft which had been necessary since January 1 when the squadron's nightly coverage was increased from six to twelve hours.

2. Problems.

The new detachment had to cope with a myriad of problems. Communications between Guam and Chu Lai, and the SEVENTH Fleet and Chu Lai were tenuous at best. Often high precedence traffic arrived days late, and routine operational traffic suffered the same fate.

v. Maintenance

Maintenance and supply headaches abounded. Many items in the pack-up kit, a portable maintenance facility with a limited number of highly

25 See OPMV Form 3760-2 (SEV5/61) for TE-4 for 16 JAN, and TE-1 for 17 JAN
26 See OPMV Form 3760-2 (SEV5/61) for TE-5 for 16 JAN, and TE-1 for 17 JAN
27 ACTION ONE 07032732 FOR 17
used parts, were used with alarming rapidity and supply officials could not
replace these needed parts fast enough. Initially, this situation required
that aircraft should be deployed carry a number of spare parts not only
for itself but also for the deployed aircraft. The supply problem finally
resolved itself to a compromise situation whereby aircraft transiting the
Philippines would receive spare parts from NSP Angeles Point.

H. Quarters

Quarters and messing have been a constant plague to the squadron.

In January when the first two crew and ground support personnel arrived,
eye were quartered and messed at Marine Task Force X-Ray northeast of the
airfield. Task Force X-Ray offered little for crew returning from a
fifteen-hour flight. Tentage was rationed and airdryers often went without
water for up to nine hours after landing. Messing facililities were adequate.
The real problem, however, remained: If the squadron is moved out of X-Ray
where can it go?

On February 14, at 1700H the problem was resolved. Enlisted flight
crews and ground personnel would move from X-Ray the next day.28 Marine
Aircraft Group 36/LSM/USMC (VMF-15) was quartered and quarters for the officers
were finally located that day in two hours to the TRD-12 area. Enlisted
personal were moved to the base at Naval Supply Activity Detachment,
(NSAD), Subic Bay. The C-47s and other National aircraft personnel were also
given space in the NSAD office's quarters. It was understood that these
quarters were only temporary and correspondence was not initiated to send
a move of all personnel to quarters in the TRD-12 area until funding for quarters
construction was available from the Naval Supply Activity, Sanging.29
The squadron believed that "all said, it was a 4-10 hour tour more desirable because of its proximity to the Batac Air."

In late May, the Commander Naval Forces Vietnam Representative (COMNAVFORVREP) in Da Nang established VFA-1's housing construction as project C901 and gave it a priority of 21.22 With the junior officers completely isolated from the MSNAV and all enlisted men, the squadron reevaluated the proposed site for housing construction and a determination was made that NSAV would be more suitable until the NAV at Chu Lai was completed.23 COMNAVFORVREP canceled and on July 4, one 12 officers billeted in MAG-12 moved to both A2 and GS in the NSAV officer billeting area.12 This consolidated, somewhat, all VFA-1 personnel then in Chu Lai. Housing was good, and the noise level, very high at MAG-12 and MAG-13, was much more comfortable. The duration from quarters to summary by available transportation remains extremely lengthy.

Even this move, however, did not substantially alter the fact that the squadron was billeted, very generously, in someone else's quarters. COMNAVFORVREP DaNang was aware, as was COMAIRWESTPAC, of this situation and in late July COMNAVFORVREP DaNang stated that "VFA-1 housing for (sic) 20 off and 25 enl will be first increment of NAV, Chu Lai, housing. Completion date contingent on availability of plumbing and elec materials."33

From July until early October, 1967, paperwork was being initiated to secure the necessary funds and materials for the squadron. On October 25 the "DEF" sent message to "Home plate" which stated that COMNAVFORVREP DaNang had

30 COMNAVFORVREP DA NANG 040560 MAY 67
31 NAVYONE 16026A MAY 67, para. 2.
32 NAVYONE GET CHARLIE 021462Z JUL 67, "Comprent as of 021400Z" JUL 67, para. 2(d).
33 COMNAVFORVREP DAMNAG 090612Z JUL 67, note 2.
visited Chu Lai and brought with him two alternatives proposals for new construction. These were: (1) for 2 officer bunks and 10 enlisted bunks in the 10ft-13 area, or (2) 5 officer bunks and 2 large barracks in the WPA complex. The message stated that funds were now available and no delay was expected.

Included in the housing proposal is a recommendation for an 11,000 square yard parking ramp to take the "Connacht" away from the WPA hot spot at the northern approach end of the runway. This would also take the standby plane off the high speed runway, making operations safer and easier for Marine units.

At year's end plans are moving ahead slowly but surely and a projected completion date for berthing construction has been established for sometime in May 1968.

c. Alternate Base During Runway Closure

The concrete runway at Chu Lai was being worn by the tempo of jet operations and it was determined in late July that the runway would have to be closed for repair. A target date for closure was tentatively set at 20 August. Commander Roth, in early August stated to COMFAIRWESTPAC that "AV-1 Det Charlie must remain in-country to provide twelve hours AEW coverage." This message went on to state that two aircraft could be based adequately at the AV-1 ramp in DaNang and the squadron would plan on doing just that starting August 20 until September 17.

Following conversations with the contractors, the Commanding General,
First Marine Air Wing, notified all concerned that there would be a temporary delay of the closure date. It was moved ahead to September 22, with concurrence established from COMFAIRMWPAC, COMNAVFLTLANT, CINCPACFLT, and COMSOUTHCOM, the squadron relocated the two VC-121 aircraft to Da-Nang on September 2. All operational message traffic was to be addressed to VC-1 Detachment DaNang with passing instructions to VN-1. A small group of ground personnel was left at Chu Lai with USMC Larry R. Boyd as Officer-in-Charge.

On September 29, AMRON ONE Det Charlie recommended that the squadron resume flight operations from Chu Lai starting September 22. COMFAIRMWPAC authorized the move back to Chu Lai. The first aircraft arrived on the 22nd at 1920H; the second on September 24th at 1000H.

3. Air Lock Modification (c)

Meanwhile, the squadron had been working on a proposal to install SRO-2/IFF detection equipment in their EC-121s. This equipment intercepts and displays MIG-21 IFF on IF-203 indicators of the AN/ARX-1 radar system. Authority to install this modification was given by Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific (COMFAIRMWPAC) sent the squadron a list of the necessary equipment. This list was also sent to Commander Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) and on January 27th COMNAVAIRPAC requested the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters (NAVAIR-
SYSCOM to provide the equipment and authority to install it. By February 6 no headway had been made and COMFAIRWESPAC reported COMAIRWESTPAC on the progress of the program. COMFAIRWESPAC in turn asked AENRON ONE and COMNAVAIRPAC to report on the progress. AENRON ONE stated, "Program static awaiting equipment and authorization." By March 16th the status of the program was unchanged and on April 19th CINCPACFLT informed the Chief of Naval Operations briefly of the squadron's mission, the possibility of a pre-dawn attack on SEVENTH Fleet units by the North Vietnamese, and then pointed out the lack of certain equipment in the WC-121, specifically SRO-2/IFF detection gear. On May 12, the squadron informed COMFAIRWESPAC of the cost of the prototype and the total for nine installations, and stated that authority had not yet been received to make the modification.

After having again been asked about the progress of the program by COMFAIRWESPAC, COMNAVAIRPAC requested NAVAIRSYSCOM to forward all information on the modification as soon as possible. The squadron was not an addee to the reply.

Then, on August 26, the squadron stated that the CONSEVENTHFLT messages of December 1966, just then received, constituted "sufficient authority" to install the equipment and the squadron would proceed to do so. COMFAIRWESPAC concurred with this determination and promptly requested COMNAVAIRPAC
to consider this "sufficient authority" and take the long awaited action on the modification. In August COMAIRPAC granted AERON ONE authority through COMFAIRESTPAC to modify the aircraft. COMFAIRESTPAC finally told the squadron to proceed on August 23.

In an early September message, AERON ONE informed Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ-1) that TE-8, Bureau Number 145936, would be positioned at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan on September 9 for typhoon reconnaissance. The squadron stated that all systems were now co and modification to the aircraft could be made at this time. On September 9, TE-8 with Lieutenant Commander Ralph L. Chenoweth as Aircraft Commander, arrived Atsugi and steps were taken to accomplish the modification. With LCDB Chenoweth on this trip were LT(jg) Norman H. Fosnire, LT(jg) Robert N. Scruggs, LT(jg) McCoy C. Watts, and LT(jg) Ralph A. Zardeskas all of whom were Combat Information Center Officers (CICO) and were instructed in the use of the gear and the type of presentation which could be expected. Also on the flight was ATL William C. Spruill. ATL Spruill fell heir to the job of installing the gear and discussing technical aspects of the modification with VQ-1's technical representative. ATL Spruill had been to Atsugi on several prior occasions to discuss the modification with VQ-1 and had been present during the initial planning stages.

The installation was completed on September 9, and LCDB Chenoweth was advised that no operational flight would be necessary to test the

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52 COMFAIRESTPAC 142902Z AUG 67
53 COMNAVPAC 230908Z AUG 67
54 COMFAIRESTPAC 250955Z AUG 67
55 AERON ONE 090404Z SEP 67
56 FARECOCORONE 090914Z SEP 67

VI-11

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equipment. It was believed at this time that TR-6 and aircraft from VN-1's Detachment at Oakama could be airborne at the same time over the Gulf of Tonkin and using the KIC method for exchange of information, VN-1 could indicate the position of the desired signal.

4. Problems.

At year's end no progress toward the successful operation of this system had been made. The flight proposed above never materialized. One component of the pilot installation made in TE-9, the tri-plate, has continually malfunctioned. This is a printed circuit board and is now being replaced by less sophisticated wiring done by any AEROON ONE Avionics personnel.

Originally the HH-21 IFF was to be displayed only at the CICO position's AP/203 Radar Indicator. This will be changed to include the AP-3A Radar Console at the 407-1 position. This was done to allow the CICO to keep continual control of a very fluid problem, since searching for cross-up indications requires constant attention.

The power amplifier portion of the system (TF) must be bought from the contractor and, hopefully, after the first of the year three more of these will be available from the manufacturer at a cost of $5,000.00 each. At year's end it was hoped that modification of four aircraft would be accomplished in early 1966.
A. Operational Statistics

During 1967, the squadron flew 11,634 hours of which 4,003 were on weather reconnaissance and 5904 were on combat support (C2D). 718 hours were spent in training and 990 other hours were flown on test, logistics, R & R and SAR missions.

**Squadron Performance**

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<tr>
<td>R &amp; R, SAR hours</td>
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<td>Total for Year</td>
<td>11,634.2</td>
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During 1967, the following missions were sent to standdown from ANW because of weather commitments:

**Standdowns**

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<td>July</td>
<td>Airborne One 2911462 - Standdown on 29-30 July</td>
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<td>Airborne One 3023202 - Standdown on 31 July</td>
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<th>Month</th>
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<td>August</td>
<td>Airborne One 3205512 - Standdown on 02 August</td>
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<td>Airborne One 3222232 - Resuming 021902</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

B. Community Relations

Commander Naval Forces Marianas has initiated a People-to-People program for foreign military visitors to Guam. Officers and enlisted men from

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59 See also Annex B, Enclosure (1).
oriental countries who will be here for extended periods of time are assigned in small groups to various commands on our island. It is then the responsibility of the command to entertain the people assigned in any way they wish.

WE-1 has hosted a number of these men throughout the year from the Republic of the Philippines Ship Cebu, Leyte and Zambales. The enlisted men were taken on tours of the island, treated to a meal in the Naval Air Station Galley, and a movie. Officers met with the Captain, were given explanations of our missions, a tour of the aircraft and were invited to luncheon in the Commissioned Officer's Mess (Closed).

C. Awards and Commandments

For the squadron's efforts in fulfilling its primary mission of weather reconnaissance, the Commanding General, Fifth Air Division expressed great admiration and thanks for the typhoon surveillance and information which was provided to him. His responsibilities for B-52 bombing operations from Okinawa dictated that he be given typhoon position and intensity "between fixes", that is every hour between our regularly scheduled fixes on 1000Z and 1600Z. He requested this information only when typhoons were located 200 miles or less from Okinawa.

Because of a perfect safety record since the squadron's commissioning in 1952, SQUONC ONE has consistently received the Commander Naval Air Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet Quarterly Aviation Safety Award. In 1967 these were awarded for all four quarters.

Congratulations for achievements of aircrews operating in the Gulf of Tonkin have also been received. CWF 77 congratulated and expressed appro-

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60 See Annex D, Enclosure (1)
61 See Annex D, Enclosure (2)
Citation to the "Crew of "airproof ECM in volunteering their services to search for survivors from Gunfighter 69, and their efficiency in locating the survivors...".

F. Television

On December 1, 1957, NEWS ON ONE presented a thirty-minute television show on KUSM-TV's "Guam USA" Program. The show consisted of a 15-minute 16mm color film depicting a typhoon penetration by one of the squadron aircraft. Sound for the film was on a separate tape. Following the film was a panel discussion whose moderator, Don Sherwood Mayo, JOC, USNR, asked questions of Commander Franklin H. Roth, Lieutenant Commander Haroldoon E. Baster, and Chief Aerographer's Mate Robert Sperreli. Wayne E. Massie, PH2, attached to Heavy Photographic Squadron SIXTY-ONE, did all filming, splicing, and editing, based on the prepared tape recording.